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 Adventures at the Fringe of Thought: William James, Modernism and Disability Studies 
 
This paper argues that new direction can be found for the modernist concept of 
stream of consciousness by returning to William James’s original insights in Principles 
of Psychology (1890). I begin by briefly outlining James’s idea of the “stream of 
thought” in order to identify the nature of its relationship to the literary technique. I 
go on to show how early readings of William  Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury 
(1929) were inspired by a modernist cognizance of “stream of consciousness” 
narration but were “ableist” in their treatment of Benjy Compson’s narrative. More 
recently, these shortcomings have been redressed from a literary disability studies 
perspective but not without importing unwarranted humanist values into Faulkner’s 
presentation of Benjy. To develop a reading of cognitive impairment which is neither 
dehumanising nor humanist, I return to James’s “stream of thought” to show how it 
can be reconciled with a recent (Deleuzian) disability studies account of “impersonal 
life”. The broader aim of this return to James is to explore how aspects of the stream 
of thought concept such as “fringe awareness” and embodied cognition might 
supplement and enrich contemporary literary and disability studies. 
  
It is surprising that the modernist concept of “stream of consciousness” should have its 
origin in the work of William James. In the chapter “The Stream of Thought” in The 
Principles of Psychology (1890) James offers an account of thinking which seems to exceed 
the notion of mind as self-aware. Emphasizing the movement of thought rather than psychic 
states as such, James pays greatest attention to the vague and inchoate feelings at the 
“fringe” of consciousness, those dimly perceived phenomena which attenuate the 
distinction between the mind and the more diffuse forces that encompass it. James denies 
that the mind has to be conscious of its own cognitive function in order to be aware of the 
things that “appear” before it. It is ironic, then, that in the context of literary studies the 
concept of stream of consciousness should have become synonymous with self-reflective 
narration.  Some of the most well-known characters in modernist fiction typically “linger 
over their own subtle impressions,”i often verbalizing perceptions, judgements, memories 
and fantasies. Whilst James resists the “givens” of ordinary selfhood such as agency, 
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intentionality and introspection, commentators on “stream of consciousness writing” 
frequently presuppose them. In this way, a humanistic model of self-reflexivity is reinforced 
as a cultural norm, despite the fact that such fictions depend “on what writers and readers 
know least in life: how another mind thinks, another body feels.”ii Accordingly, it is the 
purpose of this paper to show how James’s more radical position about the stream of 
thought might usefully supplement critical understanding of stream of consciousness fiction, 
particularly with reference to cognitively limited narrators.  To this end, I bring James’s ideas 
into dialogue with recent scholarship in disability studies, which has sought to move from 
the register of the humanistic and personal to the vitalism of impersonal life. By integrating 
James’s ideas about “fringe awareness” and embodied cognition into literary appreciation 
of stream of consciousness, I suggest that it is possible to rethink the concept as non-
deliberative, indeterminate and materially grounded. Taking William Faulkner’s The Sound 
and the Fury (1929) as my focus, I argue that the testimony of the cognitively impaired Benjy 
Compson can be read as just such an adventure at “the fringe of thought”, an account of a-
subjective life that has drifted free from its anchorage in the humanist register of 
consciousness.  
 
1. The Stream of Thought 
The phrase “the stream of consciousness” was first coined by William James in his 
Principles of Psychology (1890) to articulate the nature of “our minds as they actually live.”iii 
According to James there is an extensive “free water” of consciousness, which our focus on 
the individual “contents” of thought tends to negate:  
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The traditional psychology talks like one who should say a river consists of nothing 
but pailsful, spoonsful, quartpotsful, barrelsful, and other moulded forms of water. 
Even were the pails and the pots all actually standing in the stream, still between 
them the free water would continue to flow. It is just this free water of 
consciousness that psychologists resolutely overlook.iv 
 
In elaborating the metaphor of flow, James supplants the traditional model of mind as 
“container” of mental life, deflecting attention from the “contents” of cognition to their 
formative forces. In so doing, he develops a vocabulary of nascent affectivity, variously 
articulated in “The Stream of Thought” chapter as “feelings of tendency,”v the “halo of felt 
relations”vi and “mantle of felt affinity”vii:  
Every definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water that flows 
round it. With it goes the sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo of 
whence it came to us, the dawning sense of whither it is to lead.viii  
 
Insisting on the “re-instatement of the vague to its proper place in our mental life,”ix James 
deploys the terms “psychic overtone, suffusion, or fringe”x to designate the dim awareness 
of relations and unarticulated affinities that give rise to a sound, an image or an idea. 
Throughout his account of the stream of consciousness, he accords priority to these pre-
linguistic “comings and goings and contrasts” by means of which our coherent deliberations 
take shape.xi Such phenomena generally go unacknowledged for according to James, there 
is a tendency to dwell on the “resting places” or ‘substantive parts” of thought rather than 
the relational, “transitive parts”.xii The function of the transitive vectors is to lead us from 
one substantive conclusion to another, since in James’s view, “the main aim of our thinking 
is at all times the attainment of some other substantive part than the one from which we 
have just been dislodged.”xiii Consequently, it is difficult to appreciate the transitive parts of 
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thought for what they really are because they are inevitably eclipsed by the conclusions to 
which they tend.  
This emphasis on the fringes and flight paths of thought alerts the reader to the fact 
that “cognition” as a process of knowledge acquisition and understanding is grounded 
within a broader fund of pre-reflective relations. In fact, James asserts that “our own bodily 
position, attitude, condition, is one of the things of which some awareness, however 
inattentive, invariably accompanies the knowledge of whatever else we know.”xiv This 
striking claim significantly undermines the equation of cognition with mentation. Not only 
do the movements and dispositions of the body contribute to the stream of thought, James 
suggests that they may play a conditioning role: “We think; and as we think we feel our 
bodily selves as the seat of the thinking.”xv  
This idea of an “embodied” dimension to cognition is just one aspect of a more 
audacious revision of conceptual terminology. James also proposes that “thinking” as such 
be interpreted as a broadly  inclusive term for “every form of consciousness 
indiscriminately,”xvi including feelings and sensations: “If we could say in English ‘it thinks,’ 
as we say ‘it rains’ or ‘it blows,’ we should be stating the fact most simply and with the 
minimum of assumption. As we cannot, we must simply say that thought goes on.”xvii Rather 
than seeking to define and determine the various elements of thinking, James progressively 
undermines their apparent certainties. For example, he claims that what we call “simple 
sensations” are actually the results of fine-honed “discriminative attention.”xviii This is 
because “consciousness, from our natal day, is of a teeming multiplicity of objects and 
relations”xix and the patterns that we come to establish stem from the selective interest of 
our senses:  
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Out of what is in itself an undistinguishable, swarming continuum, devoid of 
distinction or emphasis, our senses make for us, by attending to this motion and 
ignoring that, a world full of contrasts, of sharp accents, of abrupt changes, of 
picturesque light and shade.xx  
 
All of these remarks imply that for James the stream of thought eclipses the discrete 
form of the mind or self. However, for James it is a moot point whether there is “mere 
thought, which is nobody’s thought” for we have no means of ascertaining evidence of this 
from experience. xxi Accordingly, he presents as elementary psychic facts the presupposition 
of the ownership of thought and the impenetrable barriers belonging to different personal 
minds: “The breaches between such thoughts are the most absolute breaches in nature.”xxii 
James goes on to claim that “everyone will recognize this to be true”, provided that the 
existence of “something” corresponding to the term “personal mind” is all that is insisted 
on, “without any particular view of its nature being implied.”xxiii This is an important 
qualification because it does not commit its author to any conviction concerning the 
essence of personhood. For James, thought is owned but each mind “keeps its own 
thoughts to itself.”xxiv   
Compared to the wide remit of James’s stream of thought, the literary concept of 
stream of consciousness narration is more limited in scope. David Lodge situates stream of 
consciousness within the general “interiorized rendering of experience” for which the novel 
as a literary form is celebrated: “Cogito, ergo sum (‘I think, therefore I am’) could be its 
motto, though the novelist’s cogito includes not only reasoning but also emotions, 
sensations, memories and fantasies.”xxv According to Lodge, “stream of consciousness was a 
phrase coined by William James […] to characterize the continuous flow of thought and 
sensation in the human mind.”xxvi In stream of consciousness narratives, the guiding 
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perspective of an external narrator is held in abeyance, with the story told from the point of 
view of a character’s consciousness. Robert Humphrey offers the simple definition of stream 
of consciousness as “a method of representing inner awareness,”xxvii although even this 
elementary formulation deviates from James’s more radical account of the pre-reflective 
stream. Humphrey makes reference to Henry James’s assertion that the “chamber of 
consciousness” is the chamber of experience: “Consciousness, then, is where we are aware 
of human experience.”xxviii  Not only does consciousness on this model figure as a site of self-
awareness, it also serves as a repository for thought. Humphrey proposes that the critic ask 
both “What does consciousness contain?” and what is the “ultimate significance of what 
consciousness contains”, to the various writers who deploy the technique.xxix As we have 
identified above, William James rejects the metaphor of the container, insisting that it is the 
“free water” of consciousness that psychology has failed to address. It is worth reiterating 
that James does not circumscribe the limits of consciousness as such, even though he insists 
on the barriers between different minds.  
The latter point is a cardinal one for many would agree that the “privacy” of the 
“personal mind” is well represented in the most familiar stream of consciousness technique, 
interior monologue. This device is described by Lodge as one “in which the grammatical 
subject of the discourse is an ‘I’ and we, as it were, overhear the character verbalizing his or 
her thoughts as they occur.”xxx Once again, this particular rendering imports the very things 
that James succeeds in doing without: the self-intuiting, reflective subject, who gives 
substantive form to the ‘stream’. Whilst on the face of things, it does not seem to matter 
that the literary re-casting of James’s ideas should cultivate a particular view of the “nature” 
of the mind, politically speaking, one must question the role which literature plays in 
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reinforcing the norms which it helps to construct. As we shall see, when it comes to the 
critical analysis of non-typical narrators, especially cognitively impaired ones, this humanist 
model of the self is taken as axiomatic. Contra James, both “ableist” commentators and 
their detractors assume that stream of consciousness narrative must refer back to a self-
reflective subject.  
  
2. Reading Benjy Compson’s Narrative in The Sound and the Fury 
The humanist values underpinning literary appreciation of stream of consciousness 
fiction come to the fore in the criticism of William Faulkner’s modernist classic, The Sound 
and the Fury (1929). The decline of the once genteel Compson family of Mississippi is told in 
four sections, the first of which is delivered by the cognitively impaired narrator, Benjy 
Compson. Benjy’s monologue is a non-chronological “stream” of moments from across the 
course of his thirty-three years, with minimal information as to the time, place and meaning 
of what occurs.   It is only as the novel advances and the reader is compelled to revisit 
moments of Benjy’s haphazard account that certain important coherences begin to emerge. 
For generations of readers, Benjy’s section has proved an intellectual challenge and a 
number of critics (Noel Polk, Stephen Ross, Wolfgang Iser, Donald Kartiganer) have 
questioned whether strictly speaking he can be regarded as a “narrator” at all. More 
recently, scholars analysing the novel from a disability perspective (Maria Truchan-Tataryn, 
Will Kanyusik, Alice Hall, James Berger) have questioned the “dehumanising” and ableist 
assumptions at work in these readings and have countered them with interpretations which 
vindicate Benjy’s humanity. It would seem that readers are inclined to either deny Benjy’s 
self-consciousness completely or to urgently insist that it is really there. To see what is at 
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stake in this debate for our consideration of William James, it is necessary to begin by briefly 
outlining the distinctive features of Benjy’s narrative stream.  
Faulkner’s novel opens as follows: 
Through the fence, between the curling flower spaces, I could see them hitting. They 
were coming toward where the flag was and I went along the fence. Luster was 
hunting in the grass by the flower tree. They took the flag out, and they were hitting. 
Then they put the flag back and they went to the table, and he hit and the other hit. 
Then they went on, and I went along the fence. Luster came away from the flower 
tree and we went along the fence and they stopped and we stopped and I looked 
through the fence while Luster was hunting in the grass. xxxi 
 
At first glance this simple, repetitive syntax and lexis appear unremarkable, perhaps merely 
childlike and naive. On closer inspection, however, there are distinct oddities about the 
diction. For the first time reader the references to “hitting” seem peculiar. Whilst the 
allusions to moving the flag and the words “Here, caddie” in a later paragraph confirm that a 
game of golf is being observed, Benjy’s description gives no indication of comprehending 
that the purpose of the game is to hit the ball. This is not the only incidence of a transitive 
verb being used intransitively. Benjy relates that Luster was “hunting” in the grass but when 
Luster’s own words are “reported” in Benjy’s narrative we learn that he is looking for a 
quarter which he lost there. Similarly, the words “Luster threw” which occur after we have 
been told about a bird “slanting and tilting” on a flag suggest that Luster threw a stone at 
the bird. In all these examples, Benjy describes activity rather than goal-driven actions, 
apparently failing to make inferences of cause and effect. In fact, it is noticeable that Benjy 
constantly describes occurrences as if things in the world move independently: “the spoon 
came up […] the bowl went away.”xxxii It seems that for Benjy change is not apprehended 
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according to the laws of causality and so there is no automatic assumption of a “doer” 
behind a deed.  
It will be noted here that Benjy exemplifies James’s point that the stream of thinking 
“goes on” without reference to a self-regarding ego. Indeed, his monologue amply testifies 
to the sensible continuity of thought.  As Leech and Short comment: “Benjy shows a 
tendency common in the writing of young children to string sentences of paratactic and 
coordinated main clauses together instead of resorting to subordination or sentence 
division.”xxxiii However, since the clauses in Benjy’s sentences are excessively syndetic with 
no discriminating disjunctions, they do not distinguish major information from minor 
information. With few adverbs, syntactical variants or elementary cues such as question 
marks or exclamations, it is difficult for the reader to gauge Benjy’s understanding of his 
world.   
Noel Polk speaks for many commentators when he describes Benjy’s section of The 
Sound and the Fury, as a “monstrous violation of the fictional tradition that identifies a 
“narrator,” especially a first person narrator, with a point of view and demands that 
narrators be self-conscious enough to describe what is happening to others and to 
themselves.”xxxiv Benjy is a prime example of James’s “personal mind” which keeps its 
thoughts to itself. Surprisingly, though, influential commentators such as Polk, Stephen 
Ross, Wolfgang Iser and Donald Kartiganer, seem loathe to take on the “vantage point” of 
the disabled narrator’s consciousness and are inclined to align themselves with the external 
chorus of voices that pass negative judgment on Benjy. These voices are interspersed with 
Benjy’s monologue and relay both the dialogue that characters have “about him” in his 
presence and their different responses to him as a mentally impaired individual.  
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“Now, just listen at you.” Luster said. “Hush up.” 
“What he moaning about now.” 
“Lawd knows.” Luster said. “He just starts like that [..]”xxxv  
 
As is apparent from such passages, Benjy vocalises but does not speak: “Can’t you shut up 
that moaning and slobbering, Luster said. Ain’t you shamed of yourself, making all this 
racket.”xxxvi On this point, Polk professes that many commentators have deemed Benjy “pre-
lingual” because he could not technically narrate his section. Of course, because interior 
monologue is by definition unspoken, this argument seems to mistake a literary convention 
for what it represents. However, Polk goes further: 
But he is in fact nonlingual: the language of the Benjy section is Faulkner’s language. 
Properly speaking, Benjy is not a narrator at all [..] he is merely a filter, and not 
necessarily an ordering one, for the thousands of sense impressions he processes 
every day, which may remain just as confusing for him as they do for readers.xxxvii  
 
The claim that this is “actually Faulkner’s language” could just as easily be applied to any of 
the novel’s other “narrators”. Indeed, the question of who “speaks” is part of a more 
fundamental issue about who is heard. According to Polk, Benjy’s narrative reproduces with 
extreme fidelity the speech that occurs in his vicinity: “Benjy is a passive receptor of these 
cinematic reels; he seems to have little control over what passes through his mind.”xxxviii 
Stephen Ross echoes this point, commenting that Benjy “records speech verbatim, like a 
tape recorder”xxxix and that his “psyche is one-dimensional, without depth.”xl  Here it must 
be objected that the illusion that we can “overhear” the talk of characters about Benjy 
involves no greater leap of imagination than that required for “listening in” to his inner 
thoughts. There is no compulsion to regard these conversations as “part” of his monologue. 
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In fact, to perceive Benjy as a means for reproducing the words of others, is to take notice of 
their words at the expense of tuning in to his “inner voice”. 
These judgments about Benjy’s passivity reveal the extent to which normative 
assumptions about agent-governed consciousness orientate literary criticism. For example, 
Wolfgang Iser describes Benjy’s monologue as “a form of perception devoid of any active 
consciousness.”xli Noting the “aimlessness with which events are lumped together” in his 
non-chronological stream,xlii Iser asserts that “what is missing” is a coherence between the 
individual sentences, which “seem to point in various directions without ever accomplishing 
the perception at which they are aimed.”xliii  Here the absence of conventional perception is 
taken as evidence of “Benjy’s lack of consciousness.”xliv Tellingly, Iser fails to quote a single 
word from Benjy’s section, citing instead from the “external” description of Benjy as “big”, 
“shambling” and “drooling” which is given in the fourth section of the novel. For Iser, the 
possibility that Benjy’s field of perception might be patterned according to other criteria is 
never entertained.  
The presumption that Benjy’s perceptions are aimless is echoed by Donald 
Kartiganer who, taking for granted what constitutes “normal” consciousness, suggests that 
“the Benjy section represents extreme objectivity, a condition quite impossible to the 
ordinary conscious mind.”xlv His argument rests on the assumption of “Benjy’s inability to 
‘abstract’ any order whatsoever”xlvi from the general sensory flux:  
Being an idiot, he is actually perception prior to consciousness, prior to the 
‘intelligent’ view of experience which, seeing reality as a succession of objects, is 
never content to allow it to exist in that state, but must render it immediately – in 
the very act of vision – into schematic form. xlvii 
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For Kartiganer, Benjy’s perception is “simply” a stream rather than something nuanced by 
selective interest. Apparently, James’s notion of “discriminative attention” does not apply to 
the world of this character, who is at best minimally sentient: 
He is absolutely static man, outside the flux of durational movement, and clearly free 
from time. Having no ‘mind’ his perceptions are not really that, but a ‘part of things,’ 
and thus he is truly at one with essential reality. xlviii  
 
The commentators on Benjy’s narrative who deem him to have no language (Polk), 
no agency (Ross), no intentionality (Iser) and no mind (Kartiganer) view the character as a 
mere conduit for the  general “stream” of things. From their “external” vantage point, Benjy 
lacks the criteria for normal consciousness and, by extension, for full humanity. To some 
extent, these judgments are surprising ones given that part of the power of Faulkner’s 
achievement in The Sound and the Fury is to illustrate the contrast between the prejudices 
of other characters and what Benjy appears to “say” in his interior monologue.xlix Yet as 
Maria Truchan-Tataryn argues, “the figure of Benjy’s mindless, voiceless subhumanity 
continues to resonate through Faulknerian scholarship as a believable portrait of disability.”l 
She maintains that “unquestioning acceptance” of Benjy as a “successful representation of 
intellectual disability” reveals “an underlying ableism in the literary critical endeavour and 
an academic acquiescence to dated socio-cultural constructions of disability.”li In particular, 
she takes issue with the way in which “Faulkner uses Benjy’s inferiority to demarcate the 
humanity of others, but he does not illuminate Benjy’s humanity.”lii In Truchan-Tataryn’s 
view, scholars have applauded Faulkner for constructing a “stream of consciousness that 
carries no engaged awareness”liii but have failed to query the socio-political investments 
served by the assumption that this reflects lived experience. 
13 
 
The reader should be reminded here that William James’s stream of thought also 
carries “no engaged awareness” although his invitation to readers to consider “dumb or 
anonymous psychic states”liv is not freighted with the socio-political concerns of 
representing disabled subjects. As we shall presently see, this is something of a missed 
opportunity, especially because much recent work in literary disability studies remains 
anchored to a humanist ideology of the introspective subject. The reasons for this are spelt 
out by the sociologist, James Overboe, who argues that “a fundamental tenet of the 
disability movement continues to be the validation of one’s own identity and politics based 
on various disabilities.”lv Underlying this politics of identity is the self-reflexive individual 
that is central to the modern idea of selfhood. From a humanist perspective, it is taken for 
granted that “a lack of self-reflexivity and intentionality” is “an inferior and questionable 
existence.”lvi  
This is exemplified in recent commentary on The Sound and the Fury by Will 
Kanyusik, Alice Hall and James Berger. For example, Will Kanyusik claims that Benjy 
Compson “confronts the loss of self experienced by a person who is deprived of the capacity 
for self-narration by an ableist society.”lvii According to Kanyusik, Faulkner’s Benjy “narrates 
his struggle to differentiate himself from a societal view that constructs him as Other.”lviii 
Such voluntarist language attributes unwarranted motivations to Benjy and re-positions the 
character within the self-reflective subjectivity that Faulkner so resolutely resists. For 
example, Kanyusik says that “Benji [sic] recalls his understanding of the events of his life 
that have led to his marginalization”lix and that “in relating the trauma that has come to 
define him, Benji focuses on his sense of helplessness.”lx In describing the text in this way, 
Kanyusik attributes an emotional journey to Benjy for which there is no textual evidence. 
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Equally tenuous are the claims that the “vacillation between indistinct impression and 
precise description” in Benjy’s narrative “denotes a clear conscious effort at 
understanding,”lxi and that the frequent juxtaposition between his sister Caddy’s kindness 
and Luster’s indifference “suggests some understanding” of different “emotional 
meanings.”lxii Kanyusik struggles to impute will and desire to Benjy in order to vindicate his 
humanity but the enduring fascination of Faulkner’s text is that it gives us an inner world 
entirely lacking in interiority. 
A different approach is taken by Alice Hall who emphasizes that Faulkner’s depiction 
of Benjy “challenges widespread assumptions that equated mental impairment with 
complete sensory alienation.”lxiii  She suggests that Benjy’s section “challenges realist modes 
of seeing and conventions of narrative vision,”lxiv and acknowledges the embodied nature of 
Benjy’s perception of things, particularly his acute sense of smell. As previously noted, there 
are abundant resources in James’s work to identify evidence of “thinking” which bypass the 
issue of self-awareness. However, Hall persists in referencing the “inner” life of Benjy, 
claiming that through this character Faulkner dramatizes “the relationship between external 
stimuli and interior emotional responses.”lxv The same problem of textual support 
resurfaces here for there is very little indication of “interior emotional responses” in Benjy’s 
narrative despite copious evidence of Benjy’s synaesthesia: “I couldn’t feel the gate at all, 
but I could smell the bright cold.”lxvi  
Mindful of what the reader can reasonably infer from Benjy’s words, James Berger 
approaches the text from an oblique angle, accentuating the ethics of the text rather than 
the content of Benjy’s narrative. Citing David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder’s argument that all 
of the Compson family are “explicitly judged in relation to their ability to imagine Benjy’s 
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humanity,”lxvii Berger observes that Benjy’s sister, Caddy, emerges as the character most 
inclined to respect “Benjy’s feelings and point of view.”lxviii He goes on to assert that “Benjy’s 
discourse is not intended to represent the consciousness of a severely cognitively impaired 
person; but it is intended to validate his social and ethical position [..],  to render Benjy a full 
human subject.”lxix This is an elegant solution to the perceived problem of establishing “full 
human subjectivity” for Benjy but it will be noticed that this is achieved at the expense of 
completely denying the validity of his stream of consciousness.  
Truchan-Tataryn, Kanyusik, Hall and Berger all seek to redress the ableist prejudices 
that have “dehumanised” the character of Benjy Compson but in doing so they invoke a 
discourse of human subjectivity for which there is negligible textual corroboration. To 
accept that there is no emotional centre to Benjy seems to negate his humanity yet since 
the traditional markers of humanity are patently absent from his conscious “stream” this is 
something of an impasse in the critical work. The problem clearly lies with the humanist 
norms of consciousness that are tacitly presupposed in stream of consciousness narration. If 
we return to James’s speculations in “The Stream of Thought”, it will be readily conceded 
that for thought to “go on” it need not assume substantive form, or engage a self-intuiting 
subject. To pursue this direction within a literary disability studies framework, the challenge 
is develop a non-humanist approach to cognitive impairment within which James’s insights 
might be elaborated. As we shall now see, James Overboe’s recent Deleuzian account of 
impersonal life provides such a framework and by returning to James’s ideas of 
“consciousness at the fringe” there is scope to rethink consciousness beyond self-reflective 
norms. 
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3. Consciousness at the Fringe 
It is to be recalled that in The Principles of Psychology, James formulates the phrase 
“stream of consciousness” to describe “our minds as they actually live.”lxx In the context of 
his meditations on this topic, James asserts a belief in the existence of the “personal mind” 
without committing himself to any partisan view of its nature. Indeed, he suggests that a 
thinker would be astounded “beyond measure to be let into his neighbour’s mind and to 
find how different the scenery there was from that in his own.”lxxi It is upon this tantalising   
possibility that modernist writers such as Faulkner trade. As noted at the outset, writers and 
readers can only speculate about how another mind thinks or another body feels. However, 
in the absence of an introspective voice in the narrative of Benjy Compson, there has been a 
tendency in literary criticism to either dismiss the character as mindless (confirming ableist 
prejudices) or to assign to him a reflective selfhood that is textually unjustified.  Whereas a 
character such as Molly Bloom in James Joyce’s Ulysses will periodically pass comment on 
the contents of her conscious “stream” (“I love flowers Id love to have the whole place 
swimming in roses”),lxxii Benjy Compson’s point of view is not made available to the reader.  
   This point of view may not be as imperative as commentators believe. According to 
James, it is “perfectly wanton” to assume that “the reflective consciousness of the self is 
essential to the cognitive function of thought.”lxxiii Benjy’s “adventures” endorse James’s 
position that self-awareness is not foundational and that consciousness is for the most part 
disengaged from deliberative agency. In “Affirming an Impersonal Life: A Different Register 
for Disability Studies”, James Overboe challenges the humanist view of life that privileges 
“cognition, intent, and agency.”lxxiv Inspired by Gilles Deleuze’s proposal that prior to the 
personal consciousness of subjective identity there is an impersonal zone, a “transcendental 
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field”, he suggests that disability studies might focus on the “impersonal” life that coexists 
with “the” life of an individual person. Overboe’s appeal to impersonal vitalism has striking 
resonance with James’s rejection of a foundational self. For James, individual sensibility is 
progressively and selectively crafted from a “teeming multiplicity” of objects and relations, 
an idea which bears comparison with Deleuze’s notion of the transcendental as “a pure 
stream of a-subjective consciousness [pur courant de conscience a-subjectif], a pre-reflexive 
impersonal consciousness, a qualitative duration of consciousness without a self.”lxxv This 
pure stream of consciousness does not imply the humanist values associated with a self for 
in place of the “subject” Deleuze presents the concept of “a” life. John Rajchman explains 
that for Deleuze, this indeterminate life is a potentiality or virtuality that exceeds a 
particular human life, hence “a life” is not to be confused with the individual life of a 
corresponding person: 
For ‘a’ life is always singular. It is made up of ‘singularities’ that are ‘preindividual’ or 
‘subindividual,’ which are then linked to others in a plan or ‘plane’ that is impersonal, 
like the ‘it’ in ‘it’s raining,’ which is the condition of the singularity of a life.lxxvi  
 
This example calls to mind James’s radically empiricist position: “If we could say in English ‘it 
thinks, as we say ‘it rains’ or ‘it blows,’ we should be stating the fact most simply and with 
the minimum of assumption.”lxxvii Interestingly, Rajchman goes on to suggest that our lives 
must be “indefinite or vague enough” to enter into relations with whatever precedes us “as 
constituted selves or conscious persons”lxxviii: “The vagueness of ‘a life’ is not a deficiency to 
be corrected, but rather a resource or reserve of other possibilities, our connections.”lxxix   
 
One way of elucidating this is to consider the “impersonal existence” which begins in 
infancy and co-exists with the emerging “self” as language is acquired. Arguably, this 
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impersonal life is constantly encountered at the limit or “fringe” of consciousness and is felt 
in the vague “halo” of relations which modernist writers like Faulkner succeed in tapping. If 
we abide with this insight, it is possible to see the value of a non-humanist approach to 
reading disability. The vocabulary of impersonal life is not dehumanising because the accent 
is upon a-subjective “thinking” and not self-reflective consciousness.  
Overboe’s agenda is to validate the lives of the cognitively disabled without recourse 
to the model of self-reflective subjectivity. By returning to William James’s insights in The 
Principles of Psychology it is possible to go further than this and rethink stream of 
consciousness in an impersonal register as non-deliberative, indeterminate and cognitively 
embodied. As we noted earlier, in Benjy’s narrative, transitive verbs are frequently used 
intransitively. When Benjy sees people through the fence “hitting” he does not add that 
they were hitting a ball. His descriptions reference movement and ongoing activity rather 
than aim-directed actions. Iser’s complaint that Benjy’s sentences never accomplish the 
perception at which they are aimed and fail to “come together to form a larger unit of 
meaning,”lxxx misses the point that they evoke the “transitive” states of thinking, the flight 
paths that are always effaced by attention to the “conclusions” or “resting places” of 
thought. 
If James is right to insist on the impossibility of catching thought in its flight, we must 
cultivate a sensitivity to the “vague”. In The Sound and the Fury, Benjy communicates 
comings and goings and contrasts in the moment of their evanescence. When he describes 
running from “the bright cold” into the “dark cold”lxxxi it is reasonable to infer that he is 
going inside the house but other passages are more problematic: 
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They came on. I opened the gate and they stopped, turning. I was trying to say, and I 
caught her, trying to say, and she screamed and I was trying to say and trying and 
the bright shapes began to stop and I tried to get out.lxxxii  
 
We do not need to be able to decipher Benjy’s rendition of things to be affected by its futile 
candour: “I tried to say..”. What is felt at the “fringe” is yet to be translated into 
“substantive” thought. The “stream” escapes the containers which render experience 
“mine”; it is intensely “active” yet is without coherent form.  
As mentioned earlier, James suggests that cognition is grounded within the flow of 
pre-reflective, embodied relations. This is something Kevin Booth has called the “felt 
possibilities of movement in the body schema or subject-body.”lxxxiii Benjy’s stream of 
thought may not be introspective but it is intensely proprioceptive: “the ground kept sloping 
up;”lxxxiv “the room went away, but I didn’t hush, and the room came back.”lxxxv  At the non-
conscious level of bodily thought, percepts perform cognitive functions of their own. For 
example, there is strong evidence in Faulkner’s novel that Benjy’s lingering at the fence is 
connected with an embodied cognitive schema. When Luster grumbles that Benjy snags his 
clothes on the fence every time they crawl through, it is followed by a reference to an 
earlier scene with Caddy: 
 “Can”t you never crawl through here without snagging on that nail.”  
         Caddy uncaught me and we crawled through.lxxxvi 
 
Examples of this order give a material pattern for events which might otherwise appear to 
be arbitrarily “lumped together”. However, it is important to recognise that Benjy’s 
narrative implies processes of embodied thinking that cannot be directly represented. 
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Although there may be textual cues for the triggering of involuntary memory, they resist 
easy translation into an ultimately rational world view. 
As Charlene Haddock Seigfried observes, James creates “an original concrete analysis 
of human thinking as we experience it within our horizon of being in the world.”lxxxvii Whilst 
Benjy may lack many linguistic things, he has a profound ability to see other “things.”  
According to James, “things” are nothing but special groups of sensible qualities “which 
happen practically or aesthetically to interest us” and upon which we therefore bestow 
substantive names:lxxxviii 
But in itself, apart from my interest, a particular dust-wreath on a windy day is just 
as much of an individual thing, and just as much or as little deserves an individual 
name as my own body does.lxxxix 
 
When Benjy describes his field of vision through the fence, he looks “between the curling 
flower spaces” rather than between the plants (whether actual flowers or part of the fence 
design). The spaces have shape and movement (“curling”) and are not seen privatively as 
gaps. This aesthetic stance conjures a sense of Benjy’s world which belies the prejudice that 
he is a passive recipient of a random succession of objects. James suggests that what cannot 
be articulated is often regarded conceptually as equivalent to negation but it is erroneous to 
assume an emptiness of consciousness because a looked-for clarity fails to materialise.  
We went to the library. Luster turned on the light. The windows went black, and the 
tall dark place on the wall came and I went and I touched it. It was like a door only it 
wasn’t a door.xc  
We might presume that the tall dark place that appears on the wall is a shadow (or the 
outline of where something used to hang) but like the “curling flower spaces” it has 
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discernible reality in Benjy’s world. Like the door which is not a door, Benjy’s narrative 
promises access but is shut off from the inside. We are “locked out” of Benjy’s emotional life 
just as he may be “locked in” from the vantage point of those around him. What makes the 
reading experience an endlessly enriching one is the fact that the reader does not have to 
know what it is means to live in this world to feel the force of its “delicate idiosyncrasies.”xci 
To inhabit the narrative is to dwell at the fringe, to abide with thoughts that remain elusive. 
Literature can reinforce presuppositions about what it is like to be a conscious 
subject or it can challenge them by imagining other landscapes of the mind. James’s notion 
of the stream of thought opens up new vistas of possibility for both interpreting modernist 
stream of consciousness and for disability studies. In his explorations of the “fringe,” he 
articulates a dynamics of thinking without recourse to the language of selfhood. As James 
insists, the minimal assumption of psychology is that “thinking of some sort goes on.”xcii A 
cognitively impaired narrator such as Faulkner’s Benjy may be deemed “mindless” according 
to the norms of rationality, but from the perspective of embodied cognition his testimony is 
rich in thought. If literature is involved in the discovery, invention, and creation of new 
affects, then James’s adventures at the fringe of thought open up the dizzying world of 
experience in default of epistemology. If ultimately we can agree with Kartiganer that 
Faulkner’s novel comes close to “the quality of a life in the process of becoming,”xciii it is 
because now we hear a different inflection in this suggestive phrase. It is “a” life that we 
encounter in Benjy’s narrative, a life which has “quality” in its pure becoming. There is no 
need to appeal to consciousness to make the case for the “singularity” of this life. 
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